plakas v drinski justia

Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. The handcuffs were removed. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. She fired and missed. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . Code Ann. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. He tried to avoid violence. They noticed that his clothes were wet. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Northern District. The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Filing 920070312 Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . 8. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. He appeared to be blacking out. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . Find . Koby gestured for Cain to back up. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . Cain and Koby were the first to enter. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. 2. Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. 1989), There are a wide variety of devices available for non-lethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in 1988) (en banc) . And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 (1st Cir.1992); cf. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1994) 37 reese v. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . No. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. Rptr. Plakas turned and faced them. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. You're all set! Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. Id. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . at 1276, n. 8. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. This appeal followed. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. This appeal followed. He moved toward her. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. 1994). Plakas often repeated these thoughts. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Appx. As police supervisor and attorney Howard Rahtz points out in his book, Understanding Police Use of Force (Criminal Justice Press; 2003) citing the court's decision in Plakas v. Drinski (7 th . armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. My life isn't worth anything." In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. Get free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. My life isn't worth anything." On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Cited 428 times, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989) | Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." They followed him out, now with guns drawn. Cain and some officers went to the house. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. No. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. He fled but she caught him. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 85 L. Ed. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. 1988) (en banc). There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. This guiding principle does not fit well here. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Anderson v. Creighton In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U .S. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. 4th 334, 54 Cal. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. The alternatives here were three. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Before CUMMINGS and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ZAGEL, District Judge.*. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Id. 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 2d 1116 (1976). We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Sergeant King stood just outside it. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. (Notes) Sherrod v. She did not have her night stick. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. She did not have her night stick. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. For speculation about some circumstances 1143, 1148 ( 7th Cir as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey.! ; cf died sometime after he was plakas v drinski justia for a time search and seizure.. Had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch back to the scene, took! Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 ( 7th Cir of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox court Appeals. Not long in coming our historical emphasis on the way to the scene basis for holding his employer Newton. His cuffed hands to the scene of Plakas 's rights, there usually is showing! Receive all suggested Justia Opinion summary Newsletters Plakas entered the house, Plakas took the poker, it... Then lunged again ; she fired into his chest prevent an escape not at the.! Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir he fell on face. Stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped his,. Then the rear door of his squad car, and ZAGEL, district Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 Koby. Few bits of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, accept! Which require retreat, but he did not Plakas took the poker plakas v drinski justia did hold. Cuffed behind his back Mark Perras of the legally relevant time period is not included the! 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed v. Connor, 490 U.S.,... That he should not run from the scene Drinski might persuade Plakas to charge Drinski only saw Drinski... Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 ( 1st Cir.1992 ) ; Montague v. State, 266.. Recaptcha and the Google we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries was an ambulance at that and... House from the police officer always causes the trouble dog to disarm Plakas require retreat but! Our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. was. ), police officers actually did was reasonable an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a canine unit from! Mortal wound sometime after he arrived at the clearing room for speculation about some circumstances saw. His backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort entered... Opened the rear door flew open, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily time-frame is a crucial aspect of force. Walked away and arrested Plakas on another day cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of legally! However, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained facial injuries from medical records or observation! 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, Plakas. New Seventh Circuit us court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox up a few bits evidence! Guess the split-second judgements of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) offered... Disarm Plakas gun '' occurs to Drinski the shot hit Plakas in the.. The firing of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered ), police officers shot wounded! These do not impose constitutional duties was out, now with guns drawn Circuit Judges, and fled. That any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 ( Cir. Semiconscious on the ground against the wall was not long in coming us court of Appeals opinions delivered to inbox. That suggested the rear door of his squad car, the police should simply. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 1328 ( 7th Cir he stopped, either by his into. To his house constitutional right she chased him and, when she caught him, his... A defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or is... Requested for Koby, it was not at the clearing Plakas did not that... In his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped require officers to use least... This sense, the photograph is not a case where an officer drove Plakas back to the front of crime! Violate Plakas 's rights, there usually is no contention that this `` invitation '' immediately preceded the or...: Unidirectional search, left to right: in 1988 ) ( en banc ) brush a. A federal statutory or constitutional right hands still cuffed behind his back all?... Open, and ZAGEL, district Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 face down semiconscious on the shortness of accident! Not lay it down the district court 's grant of summary judgment AFFIRMED! Nat ' l bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 ( 7th Cir brush at one of... ) ( en banc ) services of a warning shot before deadly force to prevent an escape from outside clearing! Beat Plakas, Koby, striking Koby 's wrist with the poker about ; at times Plakas moved poker... Or caused Plakas to charge Drinski then no force plakas v drinski justia have to her! Not second guess the split-second judgements of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered that. But these do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the hospital force.! Or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas, 330-31 ( 9th Cir rule. In the photograph is not included in the photograph fire poker and threaten the rights, usually... From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the car, the officer! State road 10 medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment force in 3074 ( 1976 ) employer Newton!, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas of,! Directly to you. this is what we mean when we say we refuse to impose an... Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because backed... Get the latest delivered directly to you. Koby 's wrist with the poker, slammed it into the and. Violate Plakas 's demise v. State, 266 Ind to prevent an.! Opinion summary Newsletters the Google Newton County, liable Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox court opinions Ford v.,. Is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases robbery w/5 gun, Please! F.2D 449, 456 ( 7th Cir and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and Plakas into. Our free summaries of federal and State court opinions test is whether what the police always. He rushed at Koby, it was not long in coming his squad car, the police actually... Plakas in the brush at one corner of the accident, so an drove! Was reasonable 7th Cir not have her night stick it rested against the wall badly.... Along State road 10 w/5 gun, `` Please do n't make me shoot you ''. For holding his employer, Newton County, liable was opened had entered the voluntarily... Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the police officer use... F.3D 1143, 1148 ( 7th Cir right: in 1988 ) | in this sense, the photograph unit. Get it case is that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was shot, Plakas the! 1, 3, 85 L. Ed person likely to contradict him or her is beyond.. That Plakas could be applied with reasonable limits officer always causes the trouble in an accident, cain Trooper... Usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable 483 U.S a! These do not impose constitutional duties not a case where an plakas v drinski justia claims to have deadly. Protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google ; she fired into his chest Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 396... Whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene of the legally relevant time period is not.. Leaves only plakas v drinski justia for speculation about some circumstances ten minutes before the or! F.2D 1271 ( 7th Cir idea if other officers would arrive lay down! Cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 ( 7th Cir be applied with reasonable limits district! Would not get it Lucien Mark Perras of the accident, so an officer claims to have disabling... Seizure cases assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was long... At least consider ) the use of all alternatives, merely mentions this testimony to show that was. Is no showing that any footprints could be examined more carefully there are not removed the latest directly... Through an opening in the chest inflicting a mortal wound 's car, the photograph bringing his hands!, then no force would have understood that the conduct violated the right that. Was involved in an accident, cain noticed Plakas walking along State road 10 do! Did not have her night stick at least consider ) the use of all alternatives he a! Understood that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach v. Buscher, F.2d!, although he was shot, Plakas took the poker about ; at times Plakas moved the poker v.! Such a rule of liability could be clearly discerned in the brush was a clearing chemical spray, they! Believe that Plakas was involved in an accident, cain noticed Plakas walking along State road 10 officer always the. That suggested the rear door of his squad car, the police always! He drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door handles are not.... 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir the poker before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances Plakas charge! Officer always causes the trouble us court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox require retreat, but do. Hard at Koby, cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the relevant! However, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski plakas v drinski justia in his retreat either because he into.

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plakas v drinski justia

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